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WHY NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN
HIGHER EDUCATION REQUIRE A SECOND
LOOK: THE BATTLE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM IN THE UNIVERSITY SETTING
Rebecca D. Ryan+
Chief Justice John Roberts recently articulated,
the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only
to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a
judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions
on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses
any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some
speech is not worth it.1
Although Chief Justice Roberts’ words reflect the traditional importance of
First Amendment freedoms, the application of such freedoms in the university
setting is fading.2 State universities’ interests in non-discrimination and
diversity policies have trumped students’ First Amendment claims of freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of expressive association.3
Student groups that advocate messages contrary to the public norm are
confronted with increasing pressure to alter their messages and membership
requirements.4 Should they fail to do so, these student groups must forgo the
+
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insight, thoughtful commentary, and advice, as well as Tim Chandler at the Blackstone Legal
Fellowship for his direction and inspiration in pursuing this piece. A special thanks to my
husband, Ben, and my family for their love and support—and to my mom an additional thanks for
years of support and editorial review.
1. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). In Stevens, the Court struck
down a statute that banned depictions of animal cruelty for commercial use. Id. at 1592.
2. Craig B. Anderson, Political Correctness of College Campuses: Freedom of Speech v.
Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 SMU L. REV. 171, 175–77 (1992) (foreshadowing the
“rise of a political correctness on college campuses” that “threatens to severely limit” First
Amendment rights).
3. See infra Part IV.A; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 663 (1996).
4. See, John Roberts, Professor Says Vanderbilt Suppressing Christian Student Groups
Amid Shutdown Threats, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/09/2
6/professor-says-vanderbilt-suppressing-christian-student-groups-amid-shutdown/ (noting the
struggle at Vanderbilt, where student organizations cannot require their leadership to adhere to
the group’s beliefs and that “[c]arried to its full extent, [this] means an atheist could lead a
Christian group, a man a woman’s group, a Jew a Muslim group or vice versa”).
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benefits of official recognition in the university setting.5
Whether to concede to this pressure is a difficult decision for these student
groups to make, and it is likely unconstitutional for universities to force these
student groups to decide. Yet, criticizing a university’s non-discrimination and
diversity policies in any forum is a daunting challenge. Universities have a
valid educational interest and government prerogative in promoting diversity
American society’s cultural approval of
and non-discrimination.6
non-discrimination also endorses these universities’ policies.7 This support
helps justify the choice to pursue radical equality, permitting society and the
courts to shy away from close scrutiny of the reasoning behind—and
implementation of—such policies.8 However, while non-discrimination
policies serve an essential purpose, “those purposes are contravened when
non-discrimination policies are misused.”9 Therefore, the courts must resolve
this nuanced and multifaceted conflict between expressive association and
non-discrimination in a manner that addresses its complexity and rejects
oversimplification. Due to the important constitutional rights at stake, close
scrutiny of non-discrimination policies is critical and entirely proper.10
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals case, Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, bypassing an important
opportunity to address the analysis and rationale behind state universities’
choice to value non-discrimination over diversity, and conformity over First

5. See, e.g., Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
6. See Christian Andrew D. Brown, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The Myth of Neutrality in
Nondiscrimination Policies at Public Universities, 91 N.C. L. REV. 280, 303–04 (2012); Legal
Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971, 2989–90 (2010) (describing an “all-comers policy” as one that “encourages tolerance,
cooperation, and learning among students”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003)
(affirming a school’s “compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student
body”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (stating that diversity “is a
constitutionally permissible goal” that promotes a “robust exchange of ideas”).
7. See Richard Thompson Ford, Moving Beyond Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011,
at A31.
8. See, e.g., Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990–91 (stating that a university may promote policies
favoring “state-law proscriptions on discrimination”).
9. Brief for Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5,
Alpha Delta, 123 S. Ct. 1743 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-744) [hereinafter CLS Brief]; see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University Policies Against
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369, 403 (1994) (cautioning against “diversity that is achieved by
coercing dissenters into conforming”).
10. See, Paulsen, supra note 3, at 669 (stating that state universities are applying university
or local non-discrimination laws to religious-affiliated student organizations, the appreciation of
which threatens the organizations’ First Amendment rights); see also, Bainbridge, supra note 9, at
369.
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Amendment freedoms.11 Previously, the Supreme Court decided Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, a prominent limited forum case, in which the Court
approved a state university’s “all-access” non-discrimination policy that
applied to student associations.12 The policy prohibited student associations
from establishing eligibility requirements for voting membership and
leadership positions based on compliance with the groups’ missions or
beliefs.13 Upholding the constitutionality of the policy, the Court highlighted
the reasonable relationship between the policy and the school’s academic
mission.14 Martinez, however, addressed only the specific question posed in
the petition for certiorari15 and left several key questions unresolved:16 (1) was
the university’s “all-access” policy non-discriminatory in design and
implementation?;17 and (2) whether the university had a “selective
non-discrimination” policy, and if so, was such a policy constitutional?18
11. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S.Ct. 1743 (2012).
12. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995. An “all-access” policy as defined in Martinez mandates
the acceptance of all students into all student groups. Id. at 2979.
13. Id. at 2979–80.
14. Id. at 2991. A reasonable relationship is a key part of the First Amendment analysis
with respect to limited forums. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804–06
(1985)) (“Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State . . . may not exclude speech
where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum . . . .’”).
15. The questions posed were: (1) Whether a state university can deny a religious affiliated
organization recognition because the group requires members to affirm their belief with the
group’s faith; and (2) “Whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it held . . . that the Constitution
allows a state law school to deny recognition to a religious student organization because the group
requires its officers and voting members to agree with its core religious viewpoints.” Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371).
16. The majority upheld the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the university’s all-access policy
was viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2981–82. The dissent disagreed,
noting that CLS did not claim that its application was denied due to a violation of an
“accept-all-comers policy,” but because its “bylaws did not comply with the Nondiscrimination
Policy.” Id. at 3005 (Alito, J., dissenting).
17. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534
(1993) (holding that “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative” and the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause “forbid[] subtle departures from neutrality . . . [and] covert suppression
of particular religious beliefs”). Government action targeting religious groups must be neutral
both on its face and as applied. See id. (discussing how “distinctive treatment cannot be shielded
by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality . . . [as] [t]he Free Exercise Clause
protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt”).
18. “Selective” non-discrimination policies are somewhat paradoxical in name. By
definition, these policies are facially discriminatory. See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed,
648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J., concurring), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
As a result, these policies rest on a claim that a state university has significant authority to
regulate many First Amendment freedoms. See id. At 800. However, selective
non-discrimination policies also raise questions of equal protection. See Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 327 (1986); William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A
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Of particular importance is the unanswered question of the constitutionality
of selective non-discrimination policies,19 which are policies that prohibit
discrimination based on categories such as “race, color, religion, national
origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.”20 Recently, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Alpha Delta v. Reed and held that such
selective non-discrimination policies were constitutional.21 This ruling is in
stark contrast to a 2006 opinion by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
which the court held that selective non-discrimination policies constitute patent
viewpoint discrimination and violate the First Amendment.22 Given the split
among the circuits on the constitutionality of such specifically delineated
non-discrimination policies,23 this issue remains ripe for Supreme Court
review.24
This Note discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Alpha Delta and
analyzes how the holding diverges from prior cases on the constitutionality of
university non-discrimination policies that affect religiously affiliated student
organizations. This Note begins by tracing the development of limited forum
jurisprudence and the affirmative defenses that have been raised to legitimize
states’ restrictions within such forums. This Note then analyzes the impact of
Martinez on First Amendment freedoms and closely examines the Supreme
Court’s holding on non-discrimination policies in a limited forum. Next, this
Note discusses the most recent circuit court case on the issue, Alpha Delta, and
examines its implications. Finally, this Note proposes that the Supreme Court

Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261
EDUC. L. REP. 473, 476 (Dec. 2010).
19. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 795–96 (acknowledging that the Martinez Court “expressly
declined to address whether [the] holdings would extend to a narrower non-discrimination policy
that, instead of prohibiting all membership restrictions, prohibited membership restrictions only
on certain specified bases, for example, race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation”).
20. See e.g., id. at 796 (prohibiting group membership requirements that violate the school’s
non-discrimination policy).
21. Id. at 805.
22. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006)
23. Compare Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 805 (holding that the selective non-discrimination
policy is constitutional), with Walker, 453 F.3d at 866 (holding that, even if the selective
non-discrimination policy is viewpoint neutral on its face, the policy is not viewpoint neutral in
its application).
24. See also Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 805 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“[I]t may well be that, at
some later point, this case will be an appropriate case for further Supreme Court review.”).
Interestingly, in February 2013, the University of Michigan ejected the Asian chapter of
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship because they required members to sign a statement of faith.
Eric Owens, University of Michigan Allegedly Ejects Christian Group in the Name of Tolerance,
DAILY CALLER (February 5, 2013) http://dailycaller.com/2013/02/05/university-of-michigan-alle
gedly-ejects-christian-group-in-the-name-of-tolerance/#ixzz2LXyPnqjy. InterVarsity’s National
Director commented that “The university is sending the message that religious voices are
suspect and should be marginalized. . . . I think it sends the message that the university does not
understand the nature of religious beliefs and the convictions of religious students.” Id.
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address the issue of selective non-discrimination clauses and argues that
stricter scrutiny must be applied to the university’s affirmative defense.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”25
Protecting freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of association
ensures an avenue for the advocacy of ideas in petitioning the government and
marketing ideas in the public and private squares.26 Heightened application of
First Amendment protection is crucial when the ideas expressed are
inconsistent with majority and mainstream views—specifically those ideas that
are controversial, divisive, or unorthodox.27 This protection is especially
required in the university setting, which is the next generation’s “market place
of ideas.”28

25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (“[T]he
freedom to associate for the common advancement of political beliefs . . . necessarily presupposes
the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to
those people only.”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658–61 (2000); Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (finding that statemandated inclusions of members in a private organization alters the expressive content of a
group’s message); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom
to speak, to worship and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”).
27. Ryan C. Visser, Collision Course?: Christian Legal Society v. Kane Could Create a
Split over the Right of Religious Student Groups to Associate in the Face of Law School
Antidiscrimination Policies, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 449, 461–62 (2007); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at
647–48 (stating that First Amendment rights are “crucial in preventing the majority from
imposing its view on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular ideas”).
28. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (explaining
that First Amendment rights extend to students within the “schoolhouse gate”); see also
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents for the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (noting
that America’s future depends on its youth and their exposure to ideas in the classroom); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (finding that to “impose any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation”);
Jessica B. Lyons, Defining Freedom of the College Press After Hosty v. Carter, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1771, 1794 (2006) (arguing that “the need for a viable marketplace of ideas is the
underlying principle of most First Amendment protections, both within the university and the
greater community”); Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of
Tinker in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 895, 902 (2012) (highlighting the
Court’s student speech jurisprudence post-Tinker).
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A. Defining the Limited Public Forum
The constitutionality of constraining First Amendment freedoms depends on
the type of forum that is restricted.29 In discussing the states’ ability to restrict
a forum, it is essential to distinguish between traditional public forums and
limited forums.30 Spaces that are used by the public to assemble and discuss
public questions, such as streets, parks, and open spaces, are defined as
traditional public forums.31 In a traditional public forum, the government is
forbidden from engaging in viewpoint discrimination—defined as the
preference of one message over another.32 Therefore, any restriction in the
forum must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government
interest.33 Further, the Supreme Court has held that all ideas “having even the
slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests.”34
In contrast to a traditional public forum, a limited public forum is an area
typically not open for public use but used by a certain group or open for
discussion of particular subjects.35 In a limited forum, the space has been
opened for a specific purpose, and, therefore, the government may impose
greater restrictions on its use.36 However, having established a forum’s

29. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)
(delineating the characteristic forums and the protections afforded in them).
30. See id.
31. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (discussing what constitutes a
traditional public forum); Nathan W. Kellum, If It Looks Like a Duck . . . . Traditional Public
Forum Status of Open Areas on Public University Campuses, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3–5
(2005) (noting the traditional forum analysis derives from a seminal Supreme Court case from
1939, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)).
32. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980). When determining whether a State is acting
within the set forum limits, a distinction is drawn between content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 819–20 (1995).
Content discrimination, which limits speech because of its subject matter, is permissible only
when it furthers the forum’s purpose. Id. Viewpoint discrimination, however, is presumed
impermissible due to its restrictions on the speaker’s ideology, opinion, or perspective. Id.
33. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (noting that
the government may “exclude a speaker from a traditional public forum only when the exclusion
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest”); Carey, 447 U.S. at 464–65.
34. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing how the protection of
speech is paramount, even when discussing a criminal obscenity statute).
35. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (“We have held
that a government entity may create ‘a designated public forum’ if government property that has
not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose.”);
Kellum, supra note 31, at 6–7 (discussing the various types of restrictions that can be placed on a
limited public forum).
36. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 542 (2009).
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“openness,” the government must constrain any regulations of the forum
within the boundaries it has set for itself.37
A state university may create a limited forum for specific purposes, which
can be limited to use by certain groups and for discussion of certain topics.38
Because the space has a dedicated purpose, the state may impose restrictions
on its use to foster the university’s purpose for creating the forum.39 Such a
restriction is constitutional if it is “(1) reasonable in light of the purpose of the
forum; and (2) viewpoint neutral.”40 Because the forum’s purpose limits the
state’s ability to restrict speech, establishing the mission and boundaries of the
university’s limited forum is essential.41 As a result, many of the cases
involving a limited forum in a university setting center on how the university’s
mission sets forth the forum’s boundaries.
Unfortunately, the tension between students’ First Amendment freedoms and
state universities’ educational interests is not new. Over the past five decades,
state universities have defended a variety of restrictive policies that sought to
curtail abhorrent speech,42 abide by the Establishment Clause,43 prevent
religious entanglement,44 or eradicate discrimination.45 The arguments
addressing non-discrimination policies go to the heart of the tension between
the First Amendment—which prohibits discrimination on the basis of what
people believe, say, congregate to discuss, or raise with public
authorities—and the non-discrimination norms of the Fourteenth
37. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (stating that a state can restrict speech in a limited
forum only where the limitation furthers the limited forum’s purpose); see also Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (acknowledging that a state can limit a forum
for certain groups or topics; however, viewpoint discrimination is impermissible and the
restrictions must reasonably relate to forum’s purpose); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 49 (1983) (recognizing that the government may not restrict
speech on the basis of viewpoint).
38. See Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265–67
(1981) (discussing a university’s decision to disallow a student organization from participating in
religious worship and discussion on university property).
39. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 542. Such restrictions must be viewpoint neutral
and serve a rational purpose. Id.
40. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010).
41. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing an
organization’s constitution to determine whether its restrictions were reasonable in light of the
forum’s purpose), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010),
as recognized in Stone v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Cntrs. Inc., 08-CV-1549-AJB WMC,
2011 WL 5377638 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011).
42. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (discussing a state college’s attempt to
deny official recognition of a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society).
43. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270–71 (recalling the state university’s argument that offering
its facilities to religiously-affiliated organizations would violate the Establishment Clause).
44. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
45. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979 (outlining the University of California, Hastings
College of Law’s “all-comers” policy).
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Amendment.46 Therefore, it is not surprising that the courts have reached
different conclusions on very similar facts.47
B. Established Prohibitions and Failed Affirmative Defenses for First
Amendment Restrictions in a Limited Forum
1. Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the First Amendment and the
corresponding limits on a university’s restrictive policies began with the
prohibition of viewpoint discrimination in Healy v. James.48 Healy addressed
whether a state university could justify its official non-recognition of a student
group based on the group’s philosophy.49 Central Connecticut State College, a
state-supported school, denied official recognition of Students for a
Democratic Society, stating that the group’s alleged philosophy of disruption
and violence was in discord with university policy.50 The Supreme Court held
that college officials may forbid a group from organizing where it poses a
threat to campus safety regulations, but registration could not be denied based
solely on the group’s abhorrent philosophy.51 The Court further held that a
state university that denies official recognition of a student group to prevent
disruption has the “heavy burden” of proving the restriction’s legitimacy.52

46. See infra Part III.
47. Compare Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (holding that an all-access non-discrimination
policy is constitutional), with Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding that a more narrow non-discrimination policy, which delineates specified areas of
prohibited discrimination, is unconstitutional), and Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648
F.3d 790, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a narrow non-discrimination policy, similar to the
policy addressed in Walker, is constitutional and serves a compelling state interest), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
48. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 170–71, 187–88 (1972). Today, it is well established that
“the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; see also Police Dep’t. of Chic. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972) (holding that “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”). The government
must refrain from regulating speech based on viewpoint discrimination, “when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (1995).
49. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 187 (discussing the university’s claim that the organization’s
philosophy was abhorrent).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 187–89 (holding that mere expression of an idea did not justify denial of First
Amendment rights, and quoting Justice Hugo Black in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board as stating, “‘I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of
speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the
ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.’” (quoting 367 U.S. 1,
137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting))).
52. Id. at 184 (characterizing the burden as “heavy”).
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2. Affirmative Defense: The Establishment Clause
Widmar v. Vincent further expanded the scope of First Amendment rights in
a limited forum.53 In Widmar, a religious student group brought suit after a
state university denied the group recognition because of the religious content
of its speech.54
The university argued that it had a compelling and constitutional interest in
the separation of church and state in compliance with the Establishment
Clause.55 The Supreme Court held that a university policy providing for equal
treatment of secular and religious campus groups does not offend the
Establishment Clause if the policy has “a secular legislative purpose; . . . its
principal or primary effect . . . neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; [and]
the [policy] . . . [does not] foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
According to the Court, a state’s interest in avoiding
religion.’”56
entanglement with the Establishment Clause within the limited forum, however
valid, was not a compelling interest that justified content-based or viewpoint
discrimination.57 The Court ultimately held that once a school has created a
limited forum that is open to student groups, any exclusion from—or
regulations within—that forum must be content-neutral.58 Against that
standard, the university was unable to justify the group’s exclusion on
constitutional grounds.59
3. Affirmative Defense: Religious Disentanglement
Despite the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and assurance that
equal access for religious groups does not violate the Establishment Clause,60
53. 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see Paulsen, supra note 3, at 655 (discussing Widmar’s holding).
54. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264–65. The student group had previously registered as a student
organization. Id. at 265.
55. Id. at 270; see also U.S. CONST, amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion”).
56. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274–77 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971)). The Establishment Clause protects from “‘sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
57. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
58. Id. at 277.
59. Id.
60. In 1984, Congress utilized the Equal Access Act to address the Establishment Clause
issue discussed by the Supreme Court in Widmar. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984). Under the Equal
Access Act, Congress declared that if a public secondary school created a limited forum that
students were allowed to associate, it was then prohibited from discriminating against students on
the basis of “religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech.” § 4071(a), (b). A
“limited open forum” exists whenever a public secondary school “grants an offering to or
opportunity for one or more non-curriculum related student groups to meet on school premises
during non-instructional time.” § 4071(b). Through the Equal Access Act, the Court provided
protection and rights for secondary school students to engage in religious speech, debate, and
association within public schools’ limited forum. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch.
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First Amendment issues in the limited forum continued to be contentious.61 In
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court again
addressed the issue of discrimination against a religious group within a limited
forum of the university setting.62 In Rosenberger, a student-run newspaper,
Wide Awake Productions, was denied payments for printing because of the
newspaper’s religious perspective.63 The university argued that the paper’s
Christian perspective, by “promot[ing] or manifest[ing] a particular belie[f] in
or about a deity or an ultimate reality,” violated the university’s Student
Activities Fund guidelines.64
The students filed suit, arguing that withholding payment owed to the
newspaper violated the students’ First Amendment rights.65 The university
claimed that within a limited public forum, the school has the ability and duty
to confine a forum to legitimate purposes that further its educational mission.66
While acknowledging that the university could constitutionally define its
mission, the Court held that the viewpoint discrimination in this case was
unconstitutional.67 The Court found that when a university treats religiously
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that the Equal Access Act was intended to forbid
discrimination against a student group on the basis of religion and that the Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause). The Act provides that
“It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or
other content of the speech at such meetings.”
§ 4071(b).
61. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822–23
(1995) (challenging a university’s denial of funds to a student Christian newspaper).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 822–23, 825.
64. Id. at 822–23, 827. Guidelines stated that the Student Activities Fund should be used to
support extracurricular activities that are “related to the educational purpose of the University,”
including publications related to “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic
communications media groups.” Id. at 824. Activities not reimbursed by the Fund included
“religious activities, philanthropic contributions and activities, political activities, activities that
would jeopardize the University’s tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria
or similar fees, or social entertainment or related expenses.” Id. at 825. Although both parties
agreed that the student newspaper, Wide Awake Productions, was not a “religious organization,”
the University argued that they were engaged in “religious activities.” Id. at 826–27.
65. Id. at 827.
66. Id. at 833. This was a case of viewpoint discrimination because of the focus on the
students’ specific motivating ideology. Id. at 832.
67. Id. at 834 (finding that the University engaged in viewpoint discrimination in
withholding funding); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3007 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the
majority’s emphasis on funding and noting that First Amendment rights are more than just a
matter of funding because, “[t]o university students, the campus is their world. The right to meet
on campus and use campus channels of communication is at least as important to university
students as the right to gather on the town square and use local communication forums is to the
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affiliated organizations differently, even within a limited forum, the
university’s unconstitutional acts are not protected by furthering an educational
mission.68
C. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: A Primer on Limited Public Forum
and Non-Discrimination
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez presents the most recent Supreme Court
analysis of the tension between First Amendment rights within a university’s
limited forum and non-discrimination policies.69 Martinez arose out of a claim
brought by the Christian Legal Society (CLS), a student group at the
University of California, Hastings College of Law (Hastings), which was
denied official recognition because of its bylaws.70 To receive official
recognition, Hastings required student groups to be non-commercial, to limit
membership to Hastings students, to submit bylaws to Hastings for approval,
and to comply with Hastings’ “Policies and Regulations Applying to College
Activities, Organization and Students.”71 The Christian student organization,
out of which CLS formed, operated as a Registered Student Organization
(RSO) for over a decade.72 However, in 2004, CLS’s application was
denied.73 Hastings told CLS that the organization’s policy that required voting
members and leaders to sign a Statement of Faith74 failed to comply with the
school’s non-discrimination policy.75 As a result, CLS was denied the benefits
citizen”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 795, 859 n.211 (1993)
(arguing that providing funding to religious student groups is equivalent to the financial subsidy
of providing access to school facilities).
68. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–34 (distinguishing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), and noting that “viewpoint-based restrictions are [not] proper when the University does
not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers”). It is important to note that Rosenberger
addressed student speech—not the government’s ability to control its own expression. Compare
id. at 834, with Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262–63 (1988) (finding that a
student newspaper published by the district, with district funds, involved the government’s right
to control the content of its own expression).
69. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
70. Id. at 2979–80 (detailing CLS’s exclusion of students based on religion and sexual
orientation). At Hastings, student groups apply to become registered student organizations
(RSO), a status that provides certain benefits, including receiving financial assistance from
student activity fees, communicating though Hastings’ weekly newsletter, advertising on school
bulletin boards, participating in an annual RSO fair, and using Hastings’ name and logo. Id.
71. Id. at 2979. If a group wishes to use the school’s name or logo, the group must sign a
license agreement. Id.
72. Id. at 2980.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Statement of Faith affirms fundamental Christian doctrines. Id. at 3001. Such
beliefs include the idea that the Bible is God’s word and that “acts of sexual conduct outside of
God’s design for marriage between one man and one woman” are a sin. Id.
75. Id. at 2979–80. The school’s policy states that “[Hastings] shall not discriminate
unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or
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of a RSO, including a financial subsidy and an effective means of
communicating with the larger student body.76
1. Defining the Limited Public Forum Mission in Martinez
CLS filed suit against Hastings, challenging the constitutionality of an
“all-access” non-discrimination policy restriction on student groups.77 The
Supreme Court evaluated the legitimacy of an “all-access” non-discrimination
policy applied to student groups by analyzing how the restriction serves the
purposes of Hastings’ limited forum.78 Hastings argued that its limited forum
was defined not only by its educational mission, but also by an effort to create
“opportunities to pursue academic and social interests outside of the classroom
[to] further . . . develo[p] leadership skills.”79 Hastings advocated that RSOs
are a means to achieving this mission80 and that their policy “ensure[d] that the
leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are
available to all students.”81 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hastings,
sexual orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in
Hastings-sponsored programs and activities.” Id. at 2979.
76. See supra note 70 (explaining the benefits of a student organization). Hastings argued
that denial of these benefits was simply “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
prohibition.” Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2975. The issue of funding and benefits in this factual
scenario, under the Spending Clause, is outside the scope of this Note. For more information, see
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1988) (explaining that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine precludes
the government from coercing the subject into waiving a constitutional right); Joan W. Howarth,
Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889, 919
(2009) (arguing that portraying student group recognition as a subsidy undervalues their
expressive interests); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989) (arguing that “the government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit
altogether”).
77. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2981.
78. Id. at 2978–79 (characterizing the school’s interest as promotion of education and
leadership development).
79. Id.
80. Id. Hastings argued that the “all-access” policy (1) ensures that opportunities are
available to everyone; (2) helps police the policy without requiring the school to determine an
RSO’s reason for determination; (3) encourages tolerance, cooperation, and student learning; and
(4) conveys the school’s compliance with state-law non-discrimination policies. Hastings
registers around 60 RSOs a year to further their legal educational mission and bring together
“individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs” to better “encourage tolerance, cooperation,
and learning among students.” Id. at 2990.
81. Id. at 2989; see Prospective Students, Learn About Our Students, UCLA SCHOOL OF
LAW, http://www.law.ucla.edu/prospective-students/learn-about-our-students/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 8, 2013). In 2008, the Supreme Court held that a non-discrimination policy was
reasonable in light of the school’s interest in “developing good citizenship, [promoting]
harmonious relationships . . . [and] developing a regard for law and order.” Truth v. Kent Sch.
Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cty. v. Humphries,
131 S. Ct. 447 (2010), as recognized in Stone v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Cntrs. Inc., 08-
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holding that an “all-access” non-discrimination policy is viewpoint neutral and
a valid restriction within a limited forum.82
2. “All-Access” Approval: The True Holding of Martinez
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, many expressed deep
concerns about the future of First Amendment rights in the university setting.83
Martinez’s holding, however, is quite narrow:84 a non-discrimination policy,
which is neutral and generally applicable, mandating that student groups accept
all eligible students as voting members is constitutional.85 The Supreme Court
in Martinez held that an “all-comers policy” could legitimately promote
Hastings’ educational mission.86 The Court, however, reiterated that a
university may not engage in viewpoint discrimination.87 The majority
concluded that, “so long as a public university does not contravene
constitutional limits, its choice to advance state-law goals [of nondiscrimination] through the school’s educational endeavors stands on firm
footing.”88
Therefore, Martinez does not address the constitutionality of a selective
non-discrimination policy that prohibits discrimination based on certain
categories within a limited forum.89 Instead, the case only addresses an

CV-1549-AJB WMC, 2011 WL 5377638 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011); see infra note 117 (discussing
Truth v. Kent).
82. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995.
83. See, e.g., Thro & Russo, supra note 18, at 474 (citing Editorial, The Supreme Court’s
“Subsidies”, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at A18) (noting that schools often, under the guise of
non-discrimination policies, suppress unpopular groups and views).
84. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 2978 (majority opinion).
86. Id. at 2995.
87. Id. at 2991 (stating that viewpoint-neutral barriers do not prohibit the group’s access to
other available avenues through which it may exercise its First Amendment rights, thus lessening
the burden created by any viewpoint-neutral restrictions).
88. Id. at 2990–91. This Note does not argue, or address whether Martinez was correctly
decided. However, many commentators have argued that Martinez’s holding fundamentally
contradicts other First Amendment jurisprudence found in Healy and Widmar. See e.g., Chapin
Cimino, Campus Citizenship and Associational Freedom: An Aristotelian Take on the
Nondiscrimination Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 535–37 (2011) (arguing that “the
Court was closer to getting it right the first time” when it considered “student’s associational
rights” in Healy).
89. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting). It was left to determine on remand
whether the all-access non-discrimination policy, which was determined to be constitutional if
applied to all student groups, was in fact applied in a neutral fashion. Id. at 2995 (majority
opinion). CLS tried to argue that under Hastings’ policy, a political group could “insist that its
leaders support its purposes and beliefs . . . but a religious group cannot.” Id. at 2982. However,
the Court did not address this issue and stated that “CLS’s assertion runs headlong into the
stipulation of facts it jointly submitted.” Id.

588

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:575

all-access, all-comers policy.90 The Court underscored that Hastings’ policy
“‘is justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated
speech.’”91 Acknowledging that viewpoint neutrality is the “sticking point” in
limited forum analysis, the majority highlighted that it is “hard to imagine a
more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept
all comers.”92 In contrast to other limited public forum cases like Healy,
Widmar, and Rosenberger, Hastings’ all-comers policy did not draw a
distinction between groups, and was, therefore, “textbook viewpoint neutral.”93
The dissent in Martinez focused on the discrepancies between
Hastings’ all-access policy and the actual language of Hastings’
non-discrimination policy as applied when it denied CLS’s registration.94
Looking beyond the facial neutrality and authenticity issue of the all-access
policy, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas questioned Hastings’ motivation in establishing such a
non-discrimination policy.95 The dissenters criticized the majority for ignoring
evidence that Hastings policy was not viewpoint neutral and, as a result, gave
public universities a weapon to suppress unpopular speech.96

90. See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. at 2982, 2984) (acknowledging that the Martinez court declined to extend its
holding to narrower non-discrimination policies, such as those that prohibited membership
requirements on the basis of race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1743 (2012).
91. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
92. Id. at 2993.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Overwhelming evidence, however, shows that
Hastings denied CLS’s application pursuant to the Nondiscrimination Policy and that the
accept-all-comers policy was nowhere to be found until it was mentioned by a former dean in a
deposition taken well after this case began.”).
95. Id. at 3004. The dissent noted that, until the all-comers policy was unveiled, Hastings
registered numerous student organizations that restricted membership and leadership to
individuals who agreed with the group message. Id. For example, since student groups were
required to submit a copy of their bylaws, Hastings knew that the Hastings Democratic Caucus
required that its members respect the organization’s objective. Similarly, Silenced Right limited
voting membership to students who advocated a pro-life message, and La Raza limited voting
membership to students of Hispanic background.
96. Id. at 3001; see Adam Liptak, Club that Discriminates Loses Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2010, at A18 (suggesting that the majority left open the possibility that CLS could eventually
prove that Hastings’ policy was “a pretext for antireligious animus”); see also CLS Brief, supra
note 9, at 17 (“If Martinez is correct, however, all that the campus officials in Healy needed to do
to keep the SDS off campus was to adopt a uniform policy restricting all campus student groups’
freedom of expressive association. Under Martinez—quite contrary to Healy—a state university
apparently may restrict speech and association and does have power to ‘burden’ or ‘abridge’ the
‘associational right’ of student groups ‘to associate to further their personal beliefs.’ All that is
required is that a university impose ‘neutral,’ across-the-board restrictions on all groups’
expressive association.”).
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D. The Seventh Circuit Addresses What Martinez Did Not
The Supreme Court’s limited holding in Martinez left unanswered questions
about the constitutionality of a selective non-discrimination policy that relates
to a university’s mission. However, in 2006, four years before the Supreme
Court decided Martinez, the Seventh Circuit in Christian Legal Society v.
Walker addressed and invalidated a selective non-discrimination policy that
prohibited a Christian student organization from restricting its membership.97
In Walker, Christian Legal Society (CLS) brought an action against Southern
Illinois University’s School of Law (SIU) for denying it RSO-recognition on
account of the organization’s Statement of Faith, which required voting
members and officers to abide by specific moral principles.98 The university
rejected CLS’s application, arguing that it violated state non-discrimination
laws as well as the school’s nondiscrimination policy.99 The university also
argued that CLS’s sexual abstinence requirement, which was part of the
Statement of Faith, violated the school’s non-discrimination policy.100
Because of the school’s rejection, CLS was stripped of the benefits reserved
for officially recognized student groups.101
CLS sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the university violated its
First Amendment and due process rights.102 The district court held that CLS
“had not suffered irreparable harm,” and therefore CLS failed to show
potentially successful First Amendment claims.103 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, reasoning that CLS demonstrated a likelihood that the university
unconstitutionally infringed its right of expressive association and freedom of
speech by denying the group RSO-status.104 Acknowledging that the
government can override the right of expressive association only in areas that
97. 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006).
98. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857–58. CLS’s Statement of Faith reads: “CLS welcomes anyone
to its meetings, but voting members and officers of the organization must subscribe to the
statement of faith, meaning, among other things, that they must not engage in or approve of
fornication, adultery, or homosexual conduct; or, having done so, must repent of that conduct.”
Id. at 858. A person’s past sexual conduct or homosexual inclinations did not preclude eligibility
for membership or candidacy for an officer position. Id. at 859.
99. Id. at 858.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 857–58 (noting that some of these benefits included access to the law
school List-Serve and bulletin boards, representation on the school’s website, support of an
official faculty advisor, recognition as a student organization, ability to reserve conference rooms,
and funding from student fees).
102. Id. at 857.
103. Id. at 858–59.
104. Id. at 859–60. The court also found that it was unclear whether CLS violated any SIU
policy, which was SIU’s justification for revoking CLS’s status as registered student
organization. Id. At 861 (finding a clear interference with an organization where the
“regulation . . . forces the group to accept members it does not desire”). Freedom to associate
“plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984).
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serve a compelling state interest, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
university’s actions failed to reach the mark.105 The Seventh Circuit held that
the university had no compelling interest in requiring CLS to accept members
whose conduct violated their Statement of Faith beyond “eradicating or
neutralizing particular beliefs contained in [CLS’] creed.”106
II. ALPHA DELTA: THE NINTH CIRCUIT TACKLES SELECTIVE
NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed
addressed the constitutionality of a policy very similar to the policy in Walker.
However, despite their factual similarities, the two circuits’ holdings
conflict.107
In Alpha Delta, a Christian sorority and fraternity brought suit alleging that
San Diego State University violated the organizations’ First Amendment rights
when the university rejected their application for official registration as student
organizations.108 Like other state universities, San Diego State is a limited
public forum, defined by its educational mission and forum rules.109 San
Diego State’s Student Handbook declares that the educational mission includes
a commitment to diversity and encourages students to promote “ideals of
respect, equality, diversity and freedom from harassment.”110 San Diego
State’s rejection of Alpha Delta’s application was not an isolated
occurrence.111 In fact, the university repeatedly denied the organization’s
application to become an RSO.112

105. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.
106. Id. (finding that the point of the policy was to force the group to modify its message).
107. 648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012) (concluding that
the non-discrimination policy was “viewpoint neutral and reasonable”); Walker, 453 F.3d at 858
(holding that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the policy would be unconstitutional).
108. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 795–96. The requirements for membership in the sorority,
Alpha Delta Chi, include acceptance of Jesus Christ, church attendance, and participation in
Christian service. Id. at 795. The fraternity, Alpha Gamma Omega, requires members to accept
Jesus Christ, and requires officers to sign a statement that reads:
I hearby publicly confess my belief in the Lord Jesus Christ as God and only Savior and
give witness to the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit in my life. I will make it a
purpose of my life to continue in fellowship with God through prayer and reading of
the Holy Scriptures.
Id.
109. See id. at 798 (identifying university programs that limit membership to certain groups
and require university approval as “hallmark[s] of a limited public forum” (internal citations
omitted)).
110. Id. at 798–99.
111. Id. at 795.
112. Id. at 796. San Diego had approximately 115 RSOs. Id. Recognition benefits include
university funding, use of university name and logo, use of university facilities, publicity, and
participation in school events. Id. at 795–96.
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The university denied the applications because of the group’s membership
and officer requirements, which required a belief in Christianity.113 San Diego
State alleged that requiring affirmation of religious belief for membership and
leadership in a student group violated its non-discrimination policy.114 After
the university denied the group official recognition, the plaintiffs challenged
San Diego State’s non-discrimination policy under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.115 The district court granted summary judgment for San Diego
State, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.116
Looking to its limited public forum jurisprudence,117 the Ninth Circuit
accepted the limited forum’s purpose as defined by the student handbook’s
program guidelines.118 San Diego State’s Student Handbook declares that the
educational mission includes:

113. Id. at 796.
114. Id. The full policy states:
On-campus status will not be granted to any student organization whose application is
incomplete or restricts membership or eligibility to hold appointed or elected student
officer positions in the campus-recognized chapter or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, physical or
mental handicap, ancestry, or medical condition, except as explicitly exempted under
federal law.
Id.
This policy mirrors the California State University Non-Discrimination Regulation, which states:
No campus shall recognize any fraternity, sorority, living group, honor society, or other
student organization, which discriminates on the basis of race, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, color, age, gender, marital status, citizenship, sexual orientation, or disability.
The prohibition on membership policies that discriminate on the basis of gender does
not apply to social fraternities or sororities or to other university living groups.
5 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 41500 (2012).
115. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 796. Even without official recognition, student groups may
recruit new members by handing out flyers and posting signs in areas open to all groups. Id. But,
plaintiffs must pay for access to university rooms for meetings and events, which officially
recognized groups may use for free. Id.
116. Id. at 795–96.
117. Id. at 798–99. In Alpha Delta, the court’s discussion of the forum’s “purpose” relied on
the court’s analysis and decision in Truth v. Kent School District, 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.2008). In
Truth, the Court looked to the program’s own constitution to determine if the non-discrimination
policy was reasonable with respect to the forum’s purpose. Truth, 542 F.3d at 649. The Kent
School District’s constitution listed developing good citizenship, promoting harmonious
relationships, facilitating student and faculty expression, and encouraging students to obey, honor,
and sustain state and local laws and school rules as the foundational principles guiding its
purpose. Id. The court in Truth interpreted the non-discrimination policy as advancing these
broad statements and the “school’s basic pedagogical goals,” instilling “‘shared values of a
civilized social order’ . . . includ[ing] instilling the value of non-discrimination.” Id.
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)). The court in Truth
therefore concluded that the non-discrimination policy was a reasonable limitation in light of the
purpose of the student organization forum. Id.
118. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 798–99.
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positive commitment toward diversity. . . . We encourage every
student organization to make a conscious effort to undertake
recruitment efforts to ensure diversity within the group’s
membership and to take steps to reach populations currently
underrepresented. . . . No organization will direct
recruitment . . . toward any one group (i.e. racial, ethnic, gender, etc.)
of potential members. . . . We . . . challenge you to express yourself
in a manner that promotes and maintains the ideals of respect,
equality, diversity, and freedom from harassment.119
The court concluded from the mission statement that the essential purpose of
the forum was to promote diversity; therefore, the Court found that requiring
RSOs to comply with a non-discrimination policy was reasonable.120
On the issue of viewpoint neutrality, the Ninth Circuit held that the policy
did not violate the Constitution’s Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clauses
because the policy, as written, is a “rule of general application” that does not
specifically target or burden religious groups.121 As a matter of school policy
and practice, however, student groups apparently may limit membership to
those who agree with the club’s purpose, ideology, or mission.122 Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether San Diego
State had applied the policy evenly to all student groups.123 Alpha Delta
subsequently submitted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court asking
the Court to clarify whether the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses prevent
state universities from discriminating against religiously affiliated student
organizations based on the religious nature of their association and speech.124
The Court denied the petition.125

119. Id.
120. Id. at 799.
121. Id. at 804.
122. Id. at 803–04 (pointing to other instances of inconsistency in applying the
non-discrimination policy); see also CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 7–8 (noting that the Lebanese
Club limits membership to students willing to work toward an independent Lebanon, the
Immigration Rights Coalition requires members to share their beliefs regarding immigrant rights,
and the Voices of Planned Parenthood limits membership to those committed to reproductive
freedom). There is little distinction between permitting students to require agreement with the
particular ideology, belief, or philosophy, and forbidding groups from requiring affirmation of
religious belief. See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
123. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 804.
124. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alpha Delta, 123 S. Ct. 1743 (No. 11-744). Although the
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in this case, this Note argues that the issue is still ripe
for Supreme Court review.
125. Alpha Delta, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012) (denying certiorari).
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III. HOW SELECTIVE NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES ARE BROADLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although Martinez finds “all-access” policies constitutionally permissible,126
the Alpha Delta decision strikes far beyond Martinez’s holding.127 By
applying a low standard of review to a selective non-discrimination policy that
prohibits an organization from restricting membership on the “basis of race,
sex, color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation,
physical or mental handicap, ancestry, or medical condition,” the Ninth Circuit
essentially permitted viewpoint-based discrimination.128 The court’s “hear no
evil, see no evil, speak no evil” approach failed to inquire beyond the facial
validity of the school’s affirmative defense.129 By accepting San Diego State’s
articulation of its interest in promoting a non-discrimination policy, the Ninth
Circuit overlooked significant constitutional questions.130
A. A Lack of Scrutiny: The Questions Raised by Alpha Delta
The important factual development for First Amendment cases within a
limited forum lies in the determination of a policy’s viewpoint neutrality and
reasonability,131 not only “as written” but also “as applied.”132 The Ninth
Circuit noted that San Diego State’s policy “as written” did not focus on
religious beliefs or contain restrictions that targeted religious organizations.133
However, whether a policy targets or imposes unique requirements is a factual

126. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2993 (2010); WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF
HIGHER EDUCATION at 516–20 (3d ed. 1995) (arguing that there is no obligation for a university
to create a limited public forum recognizing, supporting, or funding student groups, but if that
choice is made, all student groups must be treated the same).
127. See text accompanying supra notes 84–85.
128. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 797. Looking to Martinez, the Ninth Circuit in Alpha Delta
found no material distinctions between Hastings’ and San Diego State’s RSO programs. Id. In
addressing the purposes of the limited forum, the court concluded that San Diego State’s
non-discrimination policy was reasonable to promote diversity because the RSOs still had access
to the school’s resources and could recruit members. Id. at 798–99.
129. Id. at 803–04.
130. See id. at 805–06 (Ripple, J., concurring) (noting that “it is still an open question at the
national level”). The Ninth Circuit did not address how the university defines “diversity,” or,
more importantly, why the same non-discrimination rules do not apply to other “ideological”
organizations. These factual questions should be developed before declaring the
non-discrimination policy viewpoint neutral, both as written and as applied.
131. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (beginning its analysis with the non-discrimination
policy’s reasonableness in view of the forum’s purpose).
132. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 883 (1995)
(remanding to determine whether the facially neutral program was in fact neutral in application);
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that, although a
policy was facially neutral, there was strong evidence that the policy was not neutral as applied).
133. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 804 (stating any burden to be “incidental”).

594

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:575

question, not a legal determination.134 It is evident that San Diego State
students can limit membership based on adherence to the group’s mission.135
Yet, student groups motivated by an ideology or religious purpose may not
limit their membership or leadership.136 The question of whether any burden
created by the policy’s application falls on religious groups is also a factual
question that the courts should not dismiss lightly.137
Examining the school’s non-discrimination policy “as applied” requires,
first, determining how San Diego State understands its purpose and, second,
questioning how the policy fits this purpose.138 Ironically, within the past two
decades, select universities, including the University of California at Los
Angeles (UCLA), have argued that their non-discrimination policies should be
subsumed by an interest in promoting student-body diversity.139 One such
argument was central in Grutter v. Bollinger, a case in which the University of
Michigan Law School, when sued over admissions policies that granted
preferences to under-represented minorities,140 asked the Court to recognize
that “in the context of higher education [there is] a compelling state interest in
student body diversity.”141 Similarly, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, the Court applied a similar rationale when the University
was sued over its admissions policies, which considered race and gender in the

134. Id. at 803.
135. CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 7 (distinguishing Alpha Delta from Martinez).
136. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 796; see also CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing that this is
the exception to the general rule that student groups may limit membership and leadership to
students who agree with the group’s ideology or purpose “as a whole”).
137. See Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 804 (stating that the plaintiffs may have mischaracterized
the evidence). The Ninth Circuit accepted San Deigo State’s assertion that they did not intend to
suppress religious speech and association. Id. Even in Martinez, the Court remanded to
determine how the facially viewpoint neutral policy was actually applied, noting that CLS had a
strong argument because even under the lowest level of scrutiny, it was clear that CLS alone was
singled out. See Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The Constitutional Rights of Politically
Incorrect Groups: Christian Legal Society v. Walker As an Illustration, 33 J.C. & U.L.
361, 368–69 (2007).
138. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (explaining that a limited forum is an
area that is narrowly tailored for use by certain groups dedicated solely to select subjects).
139. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–28 (2003) (rejecting the notion that only
remedying past discrimination can provide a permissible justification for a race-based admissions
policy); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (acknowledging the
University’s argument that its admission policy takes race into account in order to achieve its
stated mission of a diverse student body).
140. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–18 (proving an explanation by the director of the law school’s
admissions process that there was no target percentage to achieve sufficient representation by the
“underrepresented”). Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, was a white Michigan resident seeking
admission to the Law School. Id. at 316–17. Grutter sued the University of Michigan Law
School for allegedly discriminating against her based on race because of the University’s policy
to attain a certain number of minority groups. Id.
141. Id. at 328.
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admission process.142 Furthermore, the university alleged that the close
relationship between its educational mission and the compelling state interest
in institutional diversity should take precedence over the f orum’s
non-discrimination rules.143 The university’s law school even submitted an
amicus brief arguing that “diversity serves a special function in education, to
prepare students for life in a pluralistic society” and that in “legal education,
built upon dialogue, debate, and the clash of conflicting opinion, diversity
makes a unique contribution to the education of all students, majority and
minority alike.”144 The Supreme Court held in favor of the universities in both
Grutter and Bakke, recognizing the corollary between the educational mission
and the universities’ interest in ensuring diversity within the student body.145
For universities that actively “manage” diversity, important questions must
be asked: How does the university define “diversity”? Why do nondiscrimination rules apply differently to certain ideological organizations?146
With such a pervasive interest in promoting diversity within the student body,
it is essential to question how diversity is defined.147 Only the facts will
disclose if the forum has been constructed in a manner designed to target
certain viewpoints and privilege others.148
142. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12. Respondent, Allan Bakke, a white male, sued the
University of California, Davis Medical School after being rejected multiple times, claiming that
it was due to a racial and ethnic quota policy. Id. at 276–78.
143. Id. at 313.
144. Brief for the Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
54, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (suggesting that to adequately prepare students to live in a pluralist
society, a ratio reflecting the proportion within the relevant school district is necessary); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (explaining that a law school that only admits African
Americans creates inequality because it excludes substantial portions of racial groups that, when
brought together in the same classroom, generate an exchange of ideas and further enhance the
learning of the law).
145. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–28 (holding that the use of race in the admissions process
forms a compelling state interest because of the educational benefits stemming from a diverse
student body); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (holding that attaining a diverse student body
is constitutionally permissible for an institution of higher education).
146. For example: Democrats, Republicans, Vegans, and Meat-Lovers. See Alpha
Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J., concurring)
(noting that Vegan students can restrict members to Vegans and still receive official recognition),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
147. See Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in
Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from Recent Judicial
Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 112 (2002) (explaining that the school’s definition of
diversity is essential because diversity is a factor in a court’s narrow tailoring analysis). For
example, Martinez rested on the premise that a university must not only adopt a true “all-comers”
policy, but also apply that policy uniformly. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994–95.
148. The forum’s message raises important questions that require additional facts. If, for
instance, the message conveyed by the university’s official action is that some religious
viewpoints are inconsistent with diversity and civil rights, that message raises Establishment
Clause issues. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing how equal treatment of student groups does not
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What is clear from the concurring opinion in Alpha Delta is that the selective
non-discrimination policy is plainly not viewpoint neutral.149 The explicit
language used in selective non-discrimination policies dictates specifically
which groups are not permitted to draw distinctions.150 Religiously affiliated
organizations, in particular, face unique challenges in exercising their freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of expressive association within
the university’s non-discrimination requirements.151 Vegans are permitted to
require their leadership to adhere to particular norms and conduct of a vegan
lifestyle, but a Jewish organization would be forbidden from requiring belief in
the Jewish faith in order to officially lead the association.152 The rationale for
not wanting a Republican to lead a Democratic student organization, or even
become a voting member, is the same rationale that applies to religious
organizations—when the membership or leadership does not adhere to the
group’s stated mission and expressive message, the message is compromised,
violate the Establishment Clause generally, and that within a limited forum any regulations
imposed on student groups must be content neutral); see also Andrew D. Brown, Do As I Say, Not
As I Do: The Myth of Neutrality in Nondiscrimination Policies at Public Universities, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 280, 304 (2012) (arguing that the failure to apply appropriate judicial scrutiny to the
constitutional validity of the restrictive measures disproportionately burdens religious groups and
is unacceptable given the rights at stake); Chapin Cimino, Campus Citizenship and Associational
Freedom: An Aristotelian Take on the Nondiscrimination Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
533, 553, 566 (2011) (arguing that restrictions on the right of expressive association should be
able to survive a strict scrutiny test and that a lower standard actually favors government
restriction, which is inappropriate in the context of protecting expressive student association);
Kara R. Moheban, Case Comment, Establishment Clause Does Not Compel University to Deny
Funding to Religious Student Publications–Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1996) (stating that the
Establishment Clause does not require a complete separation of church and state; instead, the state
must use neutral criteria and policies when providing benefits to recipients).
149. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 805 (Ripple, J., concurring) (arguing that Alpha Delta is not
controlled by Martinez, as the school’s non-discrimination policy is not an “all-comers” policy,
but rather prohibits discrimination of specified groups).
150. See supra text accompanying note 144. Such policies not only impact religious
organizations, but also affects groups formed around certain cultures or ethnic backgrounds. The
policies dilute the organization’s unique cultural identity, which ultimately fosters diversity for
the university campus.
151. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006)
(discussing a university policy that provides for equal treatment without regard to sexual
orientation, but noting that homosexual conduct conflicts with some religious organizations’
beliefs). See generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Groups Autonomy: Further Reflections
About What Is at Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153 (2006) (defending the autonomy of religious
organizations and groups because they are a source of alternative ideas for our society and our
laws).
152. See, e.g., Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010–11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“An environmentalist
group was not required to admit students who rejected global warming. An animal rights group
was not obligated to accept students who supported the use of animals to test cosmetics. But CLS
was required to admit avowed atheists. This was patent viewpoint discrimination.”); Alpha Delta,
648 F.3d at 805 (discussing the lack of restrictions on Vegan student organizations that limit
membership).

2013]

Non-Discrimination Policies and the First Amendment

597

the purpose of the association is thwarted, and the associational beliefs are
internally challenged.153
It is important that selective non-discrimination policies clearly define which
types of organizations can limit student membership. While groups with no
expressive association have no right to discriminate, as there is no message to
be compromised by the inclusion of individuals with certain beliefs, the same
is not true for expressive associational groups, such as religiously affiliated
organizations.154 As Justice Alito highlighted in Martinez, “of course there is a
strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimination where religion is
irrelevant. But it is fundamentally confused to apply a rule against religious
discrimination to a religious association.”155 It is universally understood that,
at a minimum, the Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from
discriminating against religion or regulating conduct on the basis of its
religious nature.156 Singling out one category of expressive association for
disfavored treatment is clear viewpoint discrimination, which
unconstitutionally assaults students’ First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association.157

153. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that the group’s
message would be severely thwarted by the Court forcing inclusion of a member who opposes the
message’s underlying principle); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S.
557, 579 (1995) (holding that the government may not restrict speech merely to promote popular
ideas or to discourage disfavored ideas).
154. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 660–61
(“[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s expression does not justify the
State’s effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would
derogate from the organization’s expressive message.”); James Cleith Phillips, “All of the Blood
and Treasure”: The Founders on Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 15, 24 (2011) (arguing that the
Founders would have had difficultly “understand[ing] how forcing religious intra-group diversity
would not violate religious freedom and could be justified in the name of promoting diversity,
especially when diversity could be achieved through the proliferation of diverse groups rather
than the infiltration of groups by diverse members”).
155. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for American Islamic
Congress et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No.
O8-1371)).
156. See Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
157. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority did not
“defend the constitutionality of the [school’s] Nondiscrimination Policy” because the policy
explicitly disfavored religious groups); see also Ryan C. Visser, Collision Course?: Christian
Legal Society v. Kane Could Create a Split over the Right of Religious Student Groups to
Associate in the Face of Law School Antidiscrimination Policies, 30 HAMLINE L . REV.
449, 476–77 (2007) (arguing that even if the original purpose of the school’s non-discrimination
policies sought to remedy discrimination and foster cooperation, equality, and debate, the
antidiscrimination policy ultimately promoted the school’s goal of inclusion and tolerance
through coercion in violation of the First Amendment).
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B. Scrutiny Applied: The Answers Provided by Walker
Where the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Alpha Delta failed to apply close
scrutiny to discover how selective non-discrimination policies related to the
limited forum or comported with viewpoint neutrality,158 the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis in Walker succeeded.159
In Walker, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that it “is a decidedly fatal
objective” simply “to require speakers to modify the content of their
expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with a
message of their own.”160 Although SIU, like San Diego State in Alpha Delta,
argued that de-recognition of a student organization did not contain a
significant constitutional infringement, the Seventh Circuit adopted the
Supreme Court’s holding from Healy, which prohibited indirect interferences
of constitutional freedoms, noting that such protections are vital in the context
of schools.161 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that universities are
prohibited from indirectly discriminating against religiously affiliated
organizations through the denial of official organization recognition.162
The factual question remains: What was the basis for the
targeted non-discrimination policy? The Seventh Circuit held that SIU
enforcement of its non-discrimination policy “can only be understood as
intended to induce CLS to alter its membership standards—not merely to allow
attendance by nonmembers.”163 SIU failed to identify any interest in forcing
open CLS membership beyond an apparent interest in “eradicating or
neutralizing particular beliefs contained in [CLS’s] creed.”164 The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, did not reach this conclusion, in large part because
the court did not ask the crucial factual questions. The court overlooked the
difference in the actual language between an “all access” policy and the
selectively discriminate one at issue in Alpha Delta.165 It also provided great
deference to the asserted didactic interests advocated by Hastings, and failed to
access those interests in light of cases such as Widmar or Rosenberger, which
158. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 797–98 (9th Cir. Jan. 2011)
(applying the “same analysis to both plaintiffs’ free speech and expressive association claims”),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
159. See supra notes 98–106 (discussing Walker).
160. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995)). In its rationale, the
court highlighted that CLS’s requirement for membership and officers is a “conduct”
requirement—the policies do not exclude students on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather
sexual conduct, including heterosexual conduct outside of marriage and all homosexual conduct.
Id. at 860.
161. Id. at 864 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–83 (1972)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 863 (arguing that this coercion would impair CLS’s expressive associational
message).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 797.
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strictly scrutinized such interests in a university setting.166 The Alpha Delta
court failed to look beyond the conclusory statements regarding the nature of
the non-discrimination policy. As such, it relinquished its duty to apply a
higher level of scrutiny, one that is needed to ensure the constitutional validity
of such a targeted policy.167
C. Scrutiny and Clarity: The Importance of Supreme Court Review
Overall, the Seventh Circuit addressed the crucial questions that the Ninth
Circuit abdicated: What is the message that San Diego State or SIU wants to
convey with the non-discrimination policy?; What is the non-discrimination
policy teaching about diversity?; and lastly, Why was the student group
excluded? Although San Diego State in Alpha Delta defended itself by using
a high level of generality, asserting interests of “respect, equality, diversity,
and freedom”168 as an affirmative defense, the court should not have been
convinced by such a costumed justification.
Martinez held that a prohibition against all student groups employing any
ideology, idea, or belief-oriented requirements for membership and leadership
was constitutionally permissible.169 However, the universities in Alpha Delta
and Walker permitted restrictions for membership and leadership, but
prohibited religious student groups from requiring leadership to agree with the
groups’ faith philosophy.170 These actions are plain viewpoint discrimination
and irreconcilable with First Amendment protections and jurisprudence.171

166. See supra Part I.B.; supra note 148 and accompanying text.
167. See Alpha Delta Chi Delta v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Truth
v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles
Cty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010) as recognized in Stone v. Advance Am. Cash Advance
Cntrs., Inc., 08-CV-1549-AJB WMC, 2011 WL 5377638 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011)), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012). The Court applied a level of scrutiny normally used to evaluate
a non-discrimination policy at a high school, which is arguably different than the level required
for actions undertaken by a university. See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3rd Cir.
2008) (finding a difference in First Amendment protections in a public university versus at a
public elementary school or high school); see also Brown, supra note 148, at 302–03 (“Generally,
courts give more deference to the asserted pedagogical interests of elementary and secondary
schools because of the far greater degree of paternalistic posture over students who are dependent
on adult provision and protection and whose attendance is mandatory.”).
168. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 799.
169. Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Ca. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2977 (2010).
170. Compare id. at 2978, with Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 800–01 (noting that the university’s
non-discrimination policy burdens some groups but not others), and Walker, 453 F.3d at 863
(concluding that the university’s policy burdens CLS’s ability to express its viewpoint because
accepting members who do not share its ideas impede the group’s ability to espouse its values).
171. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29, 834–35
(1995) (holding that the university’s policy, predicated only on restricting speech, was
unconstitutional).
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Martinez does not support such a conclusion.172 Instead, Martinez addressed
an “all-access” policy, not a policy that permits a state university to recognize
some student groups’ ability to limit membership and deny that same ability to
religiously affiliated student groups.173 Such viewpoint discrimination is
inherent in the selective non-discrimination policies employed in Alpha Delta
and, as such, the university’s action violates important First Amendment
freedoms.174
IV. CONCLUSION
Like the Establishment Clause, religious disentanglement, or diversity
initiatives, non-discrimination is an affirmative defense. In a case in which a
plaintiff makes a prima facie claim that a right of the forum has been violated,
the state must respond with an affirmative defense demonstrating the
legitimacy of the restriction.175 In Walker, the state could neither articulate nor
demonstrate the legality of its purpose.176 More recently, in Alpha Delta, the
Ninth Circuit did not even require the state to present an affirmative defense.
In applying equal protection, non-discrimination, or an initiative for diversity
within a limited forum, courts should require universities to articulate their
purpose, the meaning of the term “diversity,” and how the policy seeks to
achieve the ends of the created limited forum.
The Ninth Circuit failed to question what the term “diversity” meant and
what implicit message was contained within the exclusion rules. These
questions constitute a crucial step in evaluating any non-discrimination
affirmative defense in limited forum cases. Given the split among the circuits
on this issue, it is vital for the Supreme Court to determine whether such
selective non-discrimination is permissible in a limited forum and the level of
scrutiny such questions require—preserving First Amendment freedoms on
university campuses depends on it.

172. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Disaster: The Worst
Religious Freedom Case in Five Years, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 299 (2011) (recognizing that
under Martinez, state universities cannot condition forum access on expressive viewpoints).
173. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
174. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 801; CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 222 (arguing that the Ninth
Circuit missed the point, wrongly thinking that a “state university could engage in viewpoint
discrimination as long as that was not its consciously intended purpose”).
175. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (disagreeing with the university’s
argument that it had a compelling state interest in the separation of church and state and in
ensuring compliance with its obligations under the Establishment Clause); see also Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 186–87 (1972) (noting that the “government has the burden” of proving the
legitimacy of its restriction).
176. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that SIU
failed to identify any interest in forcing open CLS membership beyond an apparent interest in
“eradicating or neutralizing particular beliefs contained in [CLS’s] creed”).

